Last time we met and you urged Hemmo Leino to test the simulator, you mentioned us about the wife of Gen. Galland. Could we have the whole story now?

We were in Germany, in the year 2000 congress for the WWII fighter pilots. In one night we had a very good dinner and then some dancing. It happened that Gen. Wiedler sat in our table, actually we found ourselves in a table for guests of honour, with several high-ranking Germans and one lady. She certainly was, should I say, very interesting-looking. As the General introduced us, we found out she was widowed Mrs. (Adolf) Galland.

In the course of the night we fancied some dancing, and Gen. Nikunen was the fastest one of us to bow to Mrs. Galland. Then I asked him how dancing felt like, he told it was very nice. I decided to take courage and go for it. After the piece of music was over and we were sitting at our table, Hemmo Leino began to ponder whether he should go and ask for a dance; I encouraged him to go ahead. But he could not make up his mind. Well, later Hemmo regretted his indecision, but that is what ails old men, their courage is not any more sufficient every time.

We shall start about the aerial battles, is there any specially memorable one?

Well, when flying a mission it always came in my mind: If surprised, how to survive that, which manouvers to resot to. When flying the Curtiss (A-75) we used to, upon return leg of a mission, to spar against each other in turns, training evasive and offensive maneuvers. From that training I thoroughly learned one special manouver of my own. Later, when flying Messerschmitts, we continued similar training.

Well, once I sure was "bounced". We had been scrambled from Kymi a/b to Someri to intercept bombers approaching obviously Kotka to raid it. We were four MTs led by our Flight Leader Puhakk W/O Tuominen was supposed to be my wingman but as he disappeared from my wing I joined Puhakk

We were flying as the top cover pair near Lavansaari as Puhakka reported "there they are" and prepared to attack. I told him I would check the airspace for eventual enemies, and did a 360 degree turn, all the while scanning our surroundings, without spotting anything. On the other hand the sun in the South made it difficult to spot eventual enemies. I turned North and as I spotted the enemy planes I decided to go for them. At the very moment I felt as if somebody had tapped on my shoulder, I turned back to check my rear once more. At a distance of 30m I saw a big white prop spinner and tracers flying around me. I think I took some hits. Then I got going.

I pushed the stick ahead and to the right and kicked down my right pedal, which resulted in external barrel manouver. I knew that now he could not fire at me, not even keep me in his gunsight. I let go a couple of full turns, which made the loose objects, debris and sand in the cockpit to float freely around. After the third full turn I decided to pull out and see where the Russki is. It was a La-5, I had recognized him by the spinner and round engine. He was now 80m behind, I thought, what now? All the fighter tactics of the air force must have flashed through my mind but I did not recall anything about a situation like this. Anyway, I kept pushing the stick a little with the idea that if he aims just at me, his shells would pass over me. We continued like this for a moment and I was watching the enemy to see what he would do. Well, there he was, hanging behind me, I wondered why he did not try to shoot any more. I decided to pull up and the La followed me, a little to the side. I knew that the more I climb and turn, the more I shall lose speed. I climbed for a while, all the time keeping an eye at the one behind. He did climb to the side from me, and about 300m higher. Having lost speed I returned to level flying and began to pick up speed. There the La was staying, like a spectator, and I was wondering why he did not try to make use of his opportunity.

Having gained speed I pulled the nose up at the La and fired a couple of rounds with the cannon. The enemy reacted with an evasive manouver enabling me to cut the distance between us. As soon as he was flying straight, I fired another couple of rounds, he evaded by banking to opposite direction and againg I could cut the distance.

Finally I was at a range of 150m, in slight climb as I fired and hit him really good: his fuselage broke into two. The engine of the La kept running for a while until he turned into a vertical dive. I had hit him in the rear fuselage, the cockpit canopy was intact. Very soon the canopy flew off and the pilot bailed out. It was then as my hands and feet began to shake, as I began to think how near my death had been. When I had returned to the base, the mechanic found a bullet hole in the left wing. Examining the trajectory of the bullet with a fishing rod inserted in the hole it was found that the bullet had passed about 10cm above my head. I did have an angel to guard me.

The bullet came from the rear sector ?

Yes, when I did the evasive manouver... In this phase (describing the manouver with his hands) the bullet came over the fuselage and hit the left wing; possibly the rear armour would not have been there to stop it.
 

As far as I know you flew the Fokker D.XXI, then Curtiss A-75, and then Messerschmitt Bf 109G. Did you fly any other types, before and after ?

I flew with civilian aircraft, every type during the 27 years that I flew in Finnair.

Which was the most pleasant aircraft to fly that you encountered during your long career as pilot ?

A VL Viima at Joroinen summer 1939

It was the Viima! It could be used for aerobatics, and I agree with the large number of pilots who said it obeyed your thoughts. I got to fly it after the Smolik, and it was a big step forward. In Joroinen in summer 1939 there was a pilot course organized by the Finnish Air Defence Society and led by an Air Force Captain. The instructors were Air Force men, the mechanics too, and the aircraft. The students were schoolboys. We began with the Smolik. I remember about the Smolik that once, upon returning from an altitude flight I happened to lean against the airscrew, which bent oddly. I took a look, what was that? The airscrew shaft was almost broken off. The plane had to be repaired, and our group was given the Viim It was like a dream after the Smolik, a really good trainer aircraft.

Comparing the Curtiss and the Messerschmitt, which one was the more pleasant to fly ?

Well, both were pleasant each in their own way. The Curtiss was as if in your control all the time. More speed would have been necessary. The Messerschmitt had speed, she climbed well and was well-armed. That was it. Both types were good aircraft in their age.

Which was easier for the pilot? Was there any difference when in battle?

Nothing exceptional, everything was ready. It was not necessary to adjust the mixture of the Curtiss in normal situations.

What about the use of the MT radiator flaps, did the pilot adjust them ? As far as I know the automatics was of type on/off ?

The automatics adjusted them according to the coolant temperature. When manually adjusted they were fully open when on ground and at take-off, because the temperature of the liquids rose tremendously when taxiing. It was better for the engine to keep the temperatures down. When airborne, the automatics was switched on.

In Lipfert's book it is told that opening the radiator flaps fully could be used to decelerate the plane in ceratin situations?

The width of the radiator was like this (showing with hands, a small space). The flaps were this wide, and the movement was this much (again showing with hands). Think of it, such a small area, it cannot create great resistance. Such a small piece in each wing, I cannot see they could have had great effect. Of course, in an emergency every little thing may help.

Another analoguous case is described in Knokke's book, when he was chasing a Spitfire in reconnaissance mission. He manually closed the flaps completely.

That is another matter. He had time. He could decide to close every vent to diminish friction, flying in level flight in high altitude. Yet the radiators create a small flow, you cannot close them completely. But I do not think they are a drag-inducing factor.

Some sources claim that the effect on the maximum speed was 50kmh if the flaps were closed manually.

I do not believe that. The vent openings were so small, and they could be adjusted but half their travel. They could be opened just a little.
 

Do you remember anything special about the time of the War Pilot Course no.1?

Well, the basic training we had received in Joroinen, under the Air Force control, and we signed our obligations to do our compulsory military service in the Air Force. As the Winter War broke out, we were assembled to Kauhav There we started again from zero. We flew our test flights and were allowed to fly solo. We received double basic training which was not a bad thing in my opinion. In Joroinen we flew in summertime and in Kauhava in winter conditions.

Were you affected by fear in battle situations and if so, how did you cope with it?

At the final months of the war, during the Russian offensive, you knew that every time you take off something is definitely going to happen. One was a little in tension every time. But after takeoff you felt easier, and upon seeing Russkies you felt even more calm. Now you are facing the enemy and that is it. After a tight spot the feeling of fear came afterwards, when the situation was over.

You were so experienced that when getting into battle you knew there was no time for bungling?

Neither time nor need for any.

As you began to score, what were your feelings as the fifth victory had been won and you had attained the status of an ace?

Well, I never came to think about it at all (laughing), it was just nothing special in those circumstances.

Were the victories recorded and noted in any way ?

They were counted but it was not considered to be something remarkable, later you just read a book and realized you apparently had become an ace. They did not have very special significance. Well, the number of victories did, it gave you respect and from the cadres, appreciation. Some appreciated, some did not, for those it was a sort of personal offense...

Was there any schism between reservists and cadres in the Air Force?

There were some people who had a negative attitude all the time. But I cannot generalize. For example, as it was suggested that I should be decorated, one (cadre) lieutenant said that that decoration cannot be granted to a reservist, because he had not been granted one yet. Yet he had but one victory and I had some, cannot remember anymore. And there was such insolence when I was on duty flying Curtisses, I was not allowed to fly a mission, instead I was told I am not needed there.

Well, then it happened that a pilot of another flight was on furlough and I was asked to do alert duty for him, and always there was a battle. And I scored. That of course annoyed some. That was in the Curtiss squadron (LeLv32)
 

I have read a story about your transfer to Luukkanen's squadron. You must have had a reputation, since you were wanted in that outfit.

Well, I think I had some 13 victories, and the fact is that no squadron wanted to give their best pilots. The pilots themselves felt they had a chance but the commanders wanted to keep their most experienced pilots. This was the situation I was in, I was not allowed to transfer. Then the Messerschmitts arrived in Utti and there was a need of replacements.

I was ferrying one Curtiss from Kuorevesi to Olonez and landed in Utti. I decided to make use of the possibility to say hello to friends. Luukkanen, accompanied by Puhakka happened to come my way. I reported to him and told that I was in transit. Luukkanen held out his hand and wished me welcome "to us". I thought for a while what he meant. "Welcome to visit, I should think", I think I said, "it certainly is nice to meet friends." Luukkanen answered, "no, no, I mean you have been posted in the squadron". "Could you repeat that, Sir?" He confirmed that I had been posted to his squadron on that date and he inquired whether I could stay there at once. I told I had to ferry the plane to the base and get my transfer documents.

All Olonez was in "rasputitsa" due to ice melting from the roads and runways and I had to leave the plane in Immol I continued by train to our base in Olonez. There I reported to Lauri Bremer, the Leader of our Curtiss squadron. He was of course informed about my transfer and he asked me: "Are you happy now?" Of course I admitted I was. Esko Ruotsila was the other Lieutenant who shared the transfer with me, but we soon found out we were not allowed to leave. The posting order never came, and we were wondering why. Then it was found out that our commanders wanted to delay us, they had filed a complaint against the decision of us leaving the squadron. Then Esko Ruotsila called some old Curtiss pilots in Utti and told them: "They do not want to let us go, why don't you do something for us". In Utti they had seen the document that ordered us to be transferred to a defined unit on a defined date (to fly Messerschmitts). They sent a teleprinter message in the name of the Air Force Headquarters to Maj.Bremer, informing that the two officers had been transferred to LeLv34 and the training program will suffer if the pilots are not coming immediately. The Major believed the message and we were given our transfer documents.

The rail link to Olonez was working by that time and as we were informed about the transfer, our kits had been packed and ready. We asked for a lorry to take us to the railway station. It was still "rasputitsa", yet we got to Aunuksenkaupunki without problems, the road had been planed. But the daily train had left, maybe a few minutes before. We told the driver to follow the train, maybe we could catch it in the next stop. But the lorry was stuck in mud. We had to return to the base and spent the night there. We made the lorry driver swear that he would pick us at 0500 hrs next morning, then we certainly would catch the train. We did not tell anybody anything. I can remember how I slept on the table of our dugout, was it not hard, and then in the night I woke up as I was itching all over. We had electricity, I switched the light on and saw an unholy number of bed-bugs. And fleas, too. We had some dogs, you see, and there were swarms of dog-fleas. We never noticed them as long as we had our own beds. Anyway the lorry came on time and we were on our way. Next morning we were in Utti railway station and called the squadron for transport, they sent a car.

Lunch was served at 1100, and while we ate, an instructor sat next to each of us, showing the Messerschmitt manual about speeds and dimensions. While we were eating they told us that now we are in a hurry and you must be sent in the air as soon as possible. If we were recalled they could say that the training process is in such a stage that it cannot be interrupted any more. That is what happened. As we finished our lunch we went to the airfield at once, each of us was assigned a fighter and we studied the instruments and speeds. After a few random questions we were ordered to take off and we did.

Some people think we got to fly the Messerschmitts in a somehow unfair manner. But I told them that there was nothing unfair in this. We had been transferred, the documents were there, but "B" refused to pass them on. Nothing unfair in the whole matter.
 

You have been shot at, as the story about the hole in the wing tells. Were there any other cases?

Yes, there was a case as I downed a Pe-2 in the islands East of Kotk To begin with, the scramble order came as I was in Utti and swimming in Haukkajärvi. The flight on duty returned, probably due to running low in fuel. I mounted my bike and rode from Haukkajärvi to the base. The very first man I saw signaled to me: take your plane and get going, at once. My fighter was still under tarpaulins, I pulled them off, then my mechanic came and I climbed in the cockpit. We got the engine running and I took off. It was then that I turned the radio transceiver on, it consumed so much electricity that we did not turn them on until in the air. Then I learned that one single Pe-2 had confused the entire local air surveillance center, and the enemy was somewhere in the area, place unknown.

I passed over Kotka to South and kept a lookout in every direction, but found nothing. I had passed Kotka as I happened to take a look behind, in my rear sector, and below to the left I saw a plane. I headed for its direction and found it was a Pe-2. Being a little higher I dived at it and fired, as far as I remember, in the right engine. Since I had too much speed I had to pull up and thought, this is a simple case, I'll just pull up without any further maneuvers. But the enemy gunner fired at me. I heard nothing indicating that I should have taken a hit, I just returned for another dive. I fired at the left engine and he was going down. He hit the sea 50m from beachline.

As I approached Utti and it was time to take out the undercarriage, I pushed the button down and was surprised as it was so slack, what did it mean? Only one undercarriage leg was extended. The indicator lights are green, yellow and red. Red indicates that wheels are in and locked, green out and locked, yellow indicates something in-between. The left leg showed green at once, the right indicator light was yellow. I tried to make it go in locked position with all kind of tricks. Then Oippa Tuominen, I think, shouted in the radio: "cut speed and do something to get some centrifugal force". The wheel moved, but it remained in some intermediate position because the indicator light did not turn on, neither any other lamp. I said that the leg went down but I cannot tell its position. "Right, fly by, we shall take a look". I flew over in a low altitude and I was told the undercarriage seems to be OK. I did my best landing ever. Wind blew from the right and the plane tends to veer to that direction. I hit the left brake but it was all slack. No response, but giving brief bursts of power with the engine I managed to create enough slipstream to keep the plane in straight course. Then I saw I cannot use any more power or I shall hit the tree stumps at the far end of the runway. I cut the ignition and said to myself, here we go.

By the by the plane began to veer to the right, at an ever faster rate and then the tail went up, the soil off the runway was soft. The tail went up, then the plane began to tilt to the left, the left wingtip, a 50cm piece hit the ground with a crunch and was bent. The plane was just about to nose over, but not even the prop did contact the ground, and the plane stopped there in the normal position. My mechanic was the first one to arrive. The fire lorry crew had seen the situation, but they came anyway to check. As the firemen had left I told my ground crew, damn you, you forgot to connect some lines as the undercarriage did not work. My mechanic looked a little foolish, then he pointed at the right wing and asked "what is that?"- and it was a hole. The gunner of the Pe-2 had fired at me and cut the hydraulic lines. All the hydraulic fluid from that side had leaked out and the results I had experienced. That was that single bullet hole.
 

Was the engine of the Curtiss prone to negative G force?

No it was not the G but the tremendous pressure of the explosion. I took holes in the fuselage behind the cockpit and the controls did not work, the shell just buffeted me and caused a hitch in the engine.

Was it the sort of problem that some Merlin type engines had, where a slight negative G would interrupt the fuel feed?

It was not that fast, but the Curtiss had a similar characteristic, when doing a slow horizontal roll the engine coughed when you were upside down, but did not stop.
 

Can you hear the engine of another plane if you are flying next to it?

No, since your own engine is closer and its noise drowns that of the other one. But you can feel taking a hit, it is like "clack, clack". The holes then were the holes of the splinters of a heavy AAA shell.

Once we were pursuing three Yaks in Olonez. We spotted them as they headed for their base from the front line. We were flying quite low. We followed them, we were three. Alapuro led, Uontila was his wingman and I was alone. Alapuro got to shoot at the leader as it was landing, and got him. The other pair, ahead of him, began to circle around the airfield and I got a good shot at the rearmost plane. It pulled up hard, I saw I had hit him good. I also saw from the corner of my eye that tracers are coming in quantity and a snap was heard. I banked to the right and headed for base. I still remember seeing at the perimeter of the enemy base those old four engined crates, DB-4 or -3, they were incredible ugly aircraft.

When flying homewards my engine suddenly started shaking, and I wondered what is the matter. I saw that the fuel pressure was going down. I decreased power to make the engine run smoother. I had to cross the front lines at treetops and I could hear every shot aimed at me. When on our own side I radioed for a permission to land right on, because the fuel pressure was going down. I got the permission and landed. The mechanics found that the fuel pressure controller was unsecured and had started leaking, that was the "hole". So there was that, then the hole shot by the Pe-2, holes by heavy AAA and the 20mm hole in the left wingtip. After the war I learned that the enemy had radar in Lavansaari, it was used to lead them. Tervo had been shot down that day, or the day before.
 

(discussing Karhila's tactics when flying a three-cannon Messerschmitt)

When the enemy decreased power, I used to throttle back even more. In a high speed the turning radius is wider, using less speed I was able to out-turn him having a shorter turning radius. Then you got the deflection, unless the adversary did not spot me in time and for example banked below me. 250kmh seemed to be the optimal speed.

Which was the diving speed that made the pilot think he is not able to recover the plane or the Messerschmitt starts breaking up?

The maximum speed not to be exceeded was 750kmh. Once I was flying above Helsinki as I received a report of Russkies in the South. There was a big Cumulus cloud on my way there but I decided to fly right through. I centered the controls and then something extraordinary happened. I must have involuntarily entered into half-roll and dive. The planes had individual handling characteristics; even though I held the turning indicator in the middle, the plane kept going faster and faster, I pulled the stick, yet the plane went into an ever steeper dive.

In the same time she started rotating, and I came out of the cloud with less than one kilometer of altitude. I started pulling the stick, nothing happened, I checked the speed, it was about 850kmh. I tried to recover the plane but the stick was as if locked and nothing happened. I broke into a sweat of agony: now I am going into the sea and cannot help it. I pulled with both hands, groaning and by and by she started recovering, she recovered more, I pulled and pulled, but the surface of the sea approached, I thought I was going to crash. I kept pulling until I saw that I had survived. The distance between me and the sea may have been five meters. I pulled up and found myself on the coast of Estonia.

If I in that situation had used the vertical trim the wings would have been broken off. A minimal trim movement has a strong effect on wings when the speed limit has been exceded. I had 100kmh overspeed! It was out of all limits.

The Messerschmitt's wings were fastened with two bolts. When I saw the construction I had thought that they are strong enough but in this case I was thinking, when are they going to break

Would it have been better if the pilot had not known that the wing was held by two bolts?

No, it was better that one knew they were there.

What about the phenomenon called "buffeting" or vibration, was there any?

No, I did not encounter it even in the 850kmh speed.

How difficult was it to control the 109 in high velocities, 600 kmh and above?

The control column was as stiff as it had been fastened with tape, you could not use the ailerons. Yet you could control the plane.

The travel of the control column of the Messerschmitt was fairly short, especially sideways, I think?

The cockpit was narrow and then the pilot's legs were on the way, there was not much space for the stick. When the pilot called "Long Jimmy" was flying, he had to keep his legs bent and it was told he held the stick with his arm under his leg.

How often did the slats in the leading edge of the wing slam open without warning?

They were exteneded always suddenly but not unexpectedly. They did not operate in high speed but in low speed. One could make them go out and in by moving the stick back and forth. When turning one slat functioned ahead of the other one, but that did not affect the steering. In a battle situation one could pull a little more if the slats had come out. They had a positive effect of the slow speed handling characteristics of the Messerschmitt.

It is fascinating that these slats were built under licence of the British Handley-Page. Up to the start of the war Germans paid license fees for every Messerschmitt to H-P. Also the oval wing employed in the Spitfire was originally conceived by Heinkel. Heinkel and Supermarine had a lot of co-operation before the war. Heinkel tried to buy a licence for the Merlin engine in Germany.

Someone maintains that some Luftwaffe Messerschmitt pilots in the Western front had the slats locked in closed position. In Africa this was also done because the sand dust made the slats jam, also early E versions were prone to slat jam. The 109 included the leading edge slats starting with the very first versions which were powered by Kestrel engines, and it is quite funny that the very first version was equipped with a Rolls-Royce engine.

Another question is how the Messerschmitt reacted to hard pull? Did she stall?

There is the general opinion that you could not make her stall by pulling but she could "slip".

Then we have the standard question: Was the Messerschmitt difficult to land?

She was not difficult to land but after touchdown you must not let her curve. In Malmi there was a 10 by 10 m spot where German night fighter pilots broke at least six of their Messerschmitts. After touchdown they had veered to the right and the plane tilted to the left until the wingtip and prop contacted the ground. Yet they had logged thousands of hours with the Messerschmitt. In the night they flew like angels and landed without any veering, but in daytime they could do anything.

About the tendency of the Messerschmitt to veer at start and takeoff. This is a mythical subject. Some say it was very difficult, others say that as long as you knew what you were doing it was an easy to control plane.

It was not difficult if you had a good instructor who told you what she would do. And you can control her if you only hold the tailwheel on the ground and let her up not until there is enough speed for you to feel the vertical rudder having effect.

In Tampere in a meeting of Ilmasilta I met two younger Messerschmitt pilots who had been trained in 1946: one of them had the opinion that there were two styles of takeoff: one veering and one not veering. Some applied full power at once, treading on the right pedal. Others applied power slowly and allowed the thousand hp.s pull the plane up at leisure. "She took off by that method too".

You moved the power lever slowly and as you felt that the vertical rudder responds, the tail could be allowed to rise and then she took off on her own.

Did you use the 7.9mm machine guns of the G2 model as an aid to aiming and only then fired the cannon? Were the light MGs good for anything ?

We used to fire all guns when in good position. The G2 had more ammo for the MGs than for the cannon, so it was worthwile to shoot with every weapon. Our idea was that if the cannon was jammed so the 7mm guns were worthless, then it was time to go home.

Many a fighter pilot tells in their memoirs that the rifle caliber MG was almost useless. It could not penetrate the rear armour nor make leaks in the fuel tanks. Well, if you hit a carburator it might be split.

It pays to shoot always, you might hit for example the aileron mechanism or some other weak spot.